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# **SELINUX SUPPORT IN HFI1 AND PSM2**

Dennis Dalessandro, Network SW Engineer

**Intel Corp** 

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### WHAT IS SELINUX?

### Not just something you disable on grub boot line!

It was always the first thing I did on pretty much any system

### Complicated

- Have been developing kernel code for years, yet SELinux still confuses me!
- Have you tried to write a policy?

### A good idea

- Security is an important topic but not one you should have to worry about
- It needs to just work and have tools to support
- Tools like audit2allow makes life much easier

### **OK SO WHAT IS IT REALLY?!?**

- Detailed explanation well beyond our scope here
- See Dan Jurgen's presentation from 2016
  - Provides a great overview of SELinux and how it applies to RDMA fabrics

#### Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

- Goes beyond normal file permissions
- Multilevel Security (MLS)
  - Just because user is root doesn't mean they have an all access pass
  - Regular users can be granted different access depending on roles

#### RDMA fabrics have PKeys so enforce access controls on them Example:

User	Access Public?	Access Restricted?	Access Top Secret?
root	YES	NO	NO
user1234	YES	YES	NO
tux	YES	YES	YES

### **VERBS SUPPORT ONLY**

### Added to the kernel fairly recently (over the last few versions)

- Changes are in the IB core and SELinux core
- Should work with any driver that supports IB verbs

#### Based on PKeys

- Is that the best or only option?
- Time will tell.
- User space tooling exists

#### Does not support other protocols

- PSM in particular, which is why we have this talk
- PSM is our preferred communication library

### **REQUIREMENTS FOR PSM SELINUX**

- Support large number of labels
- Use existing PKey scheme
  - For now, who knows what the future will bring
- Support kernel bypass
- Require no changes to user space
  - Enable easy extension if we want to move away from being PKey based
- Require no changes to IB core or SELinux core
  - Enable easy extension if we want to move away from being PKey based
- Be able to work with distro and IFS installations
  - Only changing the hfi1.ko
- Require minimal to no modifications to PSM library
  - Changing user space only if we have to, so far so good

### WHAT IS A PKEY?

### PKey is 16bit non-cryptographic value

- Does not need to be a secure value
- Knowing PKey doesn't mean you have access to it (AH! So SELinux ©)

### hfi1 hardware currently supports PKey checking

- hardware checks all incoming packets to ensure a valid PKey
- send/recv contexts and SDMA engines have PKey hardware checks as well

### hfi1 driver is flexible and can support as many PKeys as needed

## WHAT IS THIS JKEY THING AND WHY USE IT?

- A JKey is a "Job Key"
  - Unique to PSM

### Allows splitting up partitions further than Pkey

Many Jkeys in a single partition

### Determined by the kernel

- Jkey = 0 has special meaning
- The rest of it is up to software
  - Currently: Use the UID to come up with a JKey
- JKey space is currently divided up into buckets (that we can change!)
  - admin users
  - kernel protocols
  - everyone else

### Using JKey as security field allows flexibility

- To scale to thousands of labels to meet future security needs
- For alternatives to PKey based security

## **USING JKEY TO HOLD THE SECURITY FIELD**

- JKey can be used to hold a flexible security field
- We can use the JKey to hold the index of the PKey
  - This way we can use the JKey hardware checks to validate the PKey
  - Could be something other than PKey some day
- Three JKey buckets becomes Four buckets
  - Exact mapping and format of the JKey is still being finalized
  - Must support sufficient number of JKeys and still maintain job separation

### **PSM DATA TRANSFERS**

#### Two ways to send data

- Programmed I/O aka PIO
- Send Direct Memory Access aka SDMA
- Differ in how data goes from user space to the hfi1 hardware

### Hardware supports both

• Tradeoffs to using one vs the other beyond the scope of this talk

#### PIO

- Kernel bypass
- SDMA
  - Goes through the kernel for SDMA engine programming

### SDMA SEND BEFORE SELINUX

#### PSM calls into kernel

#### PKey is checked in software

- Verbs and PSM share SDMA engines
- Also means JKey can not be checked in hardware
- Even verbs can have multiple PKeys in packets for a particular SDMA Engine



### **PIO SEND BEFORE SELINUX**

#### verbs

- Goes through kernel
- Multiple QPs and PKeys could be mapped to the same context
- Thus no HW PKey checks

#### PSM

- Kernel bypass
- Must use HW checks
  - Includes JKey check



### **RECEIVING DATA BEFORE SELINUX**

#### Verbs

- Global PKey table check
- Limited to 16 Pkeys currently. We can support more.
- Still has to be a check per QP

### PSM

- Kernel bypass
- Must use HW
- Also includes JKey



### SELINUX SDMA SUPPORT

#### Verbs

- Still does PKey check in SW
- PSM
  - Still does PKey check in SW
  - Adds additional check of JKey in software
  - Can not use HW JKey checking since SDMA Engines are shared with verbs
  - Same reason we can not use HW PKey checking



### **SELINUX PIO SUPPORT**

#### Verbs

- Nothing changes
- Pure SW based
- PSM
  - Nothing changes
  - Pure HW based



### **SELINUX RECEIVE SIDE SUPPORT**

#### Verbs

- Disable PKey checks since
  - Required to support > 16 PKeys
- Still have to do a PKey check for the QP in software so HW check really not needed anyway

### PSM

- Use JKey check in HW
- Preserves kernel bypass



### **CURRENT STATUS**

- Under development
- Targeting kernel 4.19 rough estimate and subject to change
- So far no changes required to
  - PSM
  - IB Core
  - SELinux Core



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# **THANK YOU**

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