From: Dan Rosenberg Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2010 21:23:40 +0000 (-0500) Subject: sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes X-Git-Tag: v2.6.37~12^2~2 X-Git-Url: https://openfabrics.org/gitweb/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb;p=~shefty%2Frdma-dev.git sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array. Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels(). In addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- diff --git a/sound/oss/soundcard.c b/sound/oss/soundcard.c index 46c0d03dbec..fcb14a09982 100644 --- a/sound/oss/soundcard.c +++ b/sound/oss/soundcard.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) int i, n; for (i = 0; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) { - if (strcmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name) == 0) { + if (strncmp(name, mixer_vols[i].name, 32) == 0) { if (present) mixer_vols[i].num = i; return mixer_vols[i].levels; @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) } n = num_mixer_volumes++; - strcpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name); + strncpy(mixer_vols[n].name, name, 32); if (present) mixer_vols[n].num = n;